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Abstract 
This paper concerns the current revival of interest in techniques advocated for 
resource allocation by purchasers of health care during the period of the 
internal market in the English NHS. In particular, Programme Budgeting and 
Marginal Analysis (PBMA), an approach strongly advocated by some health 
economists, is examined. 
 
Since the election of the ‘New Labour’ government, the NHS has undergone a 
series of structural re-organisations. Ironically, however, the current structure 
is similar to the ‘internal market’ which the government formally abolished on 
taking office; hence the renewed interest in techniques promoted at that time. 
 
In the paper a research project is discussed, which investigated resource 
allocation and performance evaluation by Health Authorities during the period 
of transition from the internal market. It suggested limitations to the use of 
techniques like PBMA. However, the current situation regarding Programme 
Budgeting seems more promising as a more pragmatic version of the 
approach is now advocated, which should be more appropriate. 
 
This issue is currently significant because Programme Budgeting is being 
developed by the Department of Health for the resource allocation decisions 
of health care commissioners. 
 
Introduction 
The past ten years have seen a dizzying series of changes to the structure of 
the National Health Service in England. Indeed Paton (2006) identifies five 
distinct stages of structural change in the evolution of the New Labour’s health 
policy. This begins with an attempt to abolish the internal market, whilst 
retaining the ‘purchaser/provider split’ (Department of Health, 1997); but it 
ends (for the time being, at least) with Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) losing their 
provider function and taking a more strategic role, whilst purchasing reverts to 
GP practices (Department of Health, 2005). Each stage is marked by an 
increase in ‘market rhetoric’ and the end point strongly resembles the later 
stages of the internal market ten years earlier. 
 
The experiences of Health Authorities in purchasing health care at that time 
are likely, therefore, to have renewed relevance. It is not suprising that there 
has been a revival of interest in techniques for resource allocation by health 
commissioners, such as programme budgeting, which formed the basis of 
experiments in the internal market. Consequently, it seems apposite to re-
examine a research project carried out in the period of transition from the 
internal market to the New NHS.  
 
In this paper, I report on an inter-disciplinary study into resource allocation 
and performance evaluation by Health Authorities in that period. The results of 
the interview and questionnaire stages of the study supported the view that it 
is impractical to apply comprehensively rationalistic approaches, such as the 
form of programme budgeting then advocated, in this context. This resembled 
previous studies, accessed in the literature review, in indicating the limitations 
of conventional health economics.  
There has been a revival of interest in Programme Budgeting recently, 
however, and the Department of Health is adopting a version of the approach 
for resource allocation decisions by health care commissioners in the English 
NHS. Some reservations might be held concerning this in the light of previous 
experiences, but contemporary research into the applications of programme 
budgeting is needed, particularly as recent advocacy seems to support a 
more pragmatic version of the technique. 
 
This paper adds to the extant literature both by reporting on the 
commissioning practices of health care purchasers and relating that 
experience to more recent developments in resource allocation.  
 
The Research Project 
This study consisted of 
 a literature review; 
 interviews carried out with staff at two Health Authorities, chosen because 
they contrasted in terms of socio-economic factors, urbanisation and 
industrialisation; 
 survey questionnaires, sent to all other Health Authorities in England. 
 
Authority A was dominated by a large industrial city and had quite a high level 
of socio-economic deprivation. Authority B had many large towns separated 
by rural areas. 
 
The study was intended to test the following linked hypotheses: 
i) Commissioning decisions were based largely on historical patterns of 
spending ('incrementalism'). 
ii) Methods of budgeting were concerned mainly with costs and inputs 
and tend to neglect outputs and outcomes. 
iii) Performance indicators were relatively underdeveloped and, where 
they did exist, were concerned mainly with cost containment. 
iv) The processes of priority setting between and within programmes were 
not well integrated and were usually dominated by 'political' 
considerations within organisations. 
 
A further issue which emerged as particularly significant during the study was 
the extent to which conventional health economics is useful in explaining 
and/or improving resource allocation decisions in health care. Conventional, 
or mainstream, health economics is characterised here as a formalised, 
evidence based approach to decision-making, grounded in means-ends 
rationality and intended to provide definitive judgements on choices. 
 
The research had a triangulated design, with each part of the study 
complementing each other. Issues to be covered in the interviews were 
identified from the literature review and issues for the survey questionnaire 
from both the review and the interviews. Studies of priority setting in the public 
sector were found in the economics, accounting and political science literature 
and reviewed.  
 
The interview stage of the research had internal validity, as it gave a good 
representation of the views of those making resource allocation decisions in 
the two organisations, although the extent to which the findings of case study 
research can be applied beyond the original case is always debatable. The 
use of the questionnaire countered this, however, although the response rate 
was rather disappointing at around 20%. Nevertheless, the triangulated 
design should compensate for any shortcomings in any stage of the research.  
  
Literature Review 
One of the most widely welcomed aspects of the 1989 NHS reforms was the 
requirement that Health Authority resource allocation decisions should be 
based on a systematic assessment of needs (Department of Health, 1989; 
Shanks, Kherad and Fish, 1995). Following the abolition of the internal 
market, the retention of the purchaser/provider split was intended to motivate 
commissioners to continue assessing how to best allocate their scarce 
resources (Department of Health, 1997). 
 
However, Health Authorities varied greatly in methods for setting priorities 
(Obermann and Tolley, 1997). Most of the approaches adopted have been 
criticised persuasively by mainstream health economists for, inter alia, 
neglecting the potential costs and benefits of competing options for health 
care. Instead they have advocated the techniques of programme budgeting 
and marginal analysis. As a basis for budgeting, programmes have the 
advantage of corresponding to how care is actually delivered to the recipient, 
both within and across organisations, rather than reflecting organisational 
structures. Furthermore, by focusing on changes at the margins, it is claimed 
that the health economics approach directs decision-makers away from the 
mass of data to the key issues (Cohen and Henderson, 1988; Mooney, 1994). 
 
Studies of Health Authority commissioning suggested that there had been 
some movement from incremental to more formalised methods of priority 
setting during the period of the internal market (Klein and Redmayne, 1992;  
Ham, 1993; Obermann and Tolley, 1997). Significantly, in the early stages of 
the internal market, a number of studies reported on projects aspiring to 
implement the mainstream health economics approach (e.g. Donaldson and 
Farrar, 1993; Cohen, 1994; Cohen, 1995; Craig, Parkin and Gerard, 1995; 
Honigsbaum, Richards and Lockett, 1995; Madden, Hussey, Mooney and 
Church, 1995). These studies remain relevant; not least, because they are 
cited as exemplars by more recent advocates of PBMA (e.g. Department of 
Health, 2007). 
  
In the literature review, we also examined these papers and it was notable 
that, in practice, they had been carried out to some effect, but far more 
pragmatically than the theory underpinning conventional health economics 
would suggest. This is due not only to technical difficulties, but also partly to 
the impracticality of comprehensive evidence-based evaluation (e.g. lack of 
firm evidence base and insufficient information), and partly to the complex 
behavioural aspects of health care decision-making, neither of which is 
accommodated in the underlying theory.   
 
The pragmatic approach seems somewhat ironic in the light of the criticism of 
other approaches as theoretically unsound, although the studies themselves 
do contain undoubted insights. The inability to implement comprehensively 
rationalistic procedures echoes the failure of earlier attempts at 'rational' 
methods of resource allocation in the public sector (see, for example, Elcock, 
Jordan and Midwinter, 1989; Jones and Pendlebury, 2000).  This argument 
supports those who advocate 'muddling through elegantly' (Hunter, 1997).  A 
modified version of the health economics approach, however, could be 
compatible with this perspective and give valuable results in practice (see 
Honigsbaum et al, 1995). I shall argue later in the paper that this has been the 
trend more recently (see Peacock, Ruta, Mitton, Donaldson, Bate and 
Murtagh, 2006).  
 
Interviews  
In general, the results of the interviews at the two health authorities gave 
support to the original hypotheses of the study. It appeared, however, that 
target setting derived from the Health of the Nation document (Department of 
Health, 1992) was more significant than expected and incrementalism 
somewhat less so. 
 
Budgeting seemed mainly concerned with inputs and costs in both authorities 
and performance was measured largely in terms of activity and output.  
Outcome indicators were seen as costly to generate and, where they existed, 
there was a range of diverse measures making comparisons difficult. Quality 
Adjusted Life Years and similar techniques were not used, although there was 
an awareness of their existence.  Indeed, there was little, if any, evidence of 
the utilisation of techniques derived from health economics. 
 
Decision-making did not appear to be well co-ordinated between programmes 
and internal political pressures and constraints, not surprisingly, played an 
important role in resource allocation. Similarly, whilst there were attempts at 
consultation with the community, participation and accountability were 
regarded as problematic. 
 
In Authority A, the process of resource allocation did not appear to be well 
integrated or well understood by all participants, although there were serious 
and significant attempts at innovative approaches within this organisation. For 
example, the Authority’s priorities were set in its Health Investment Plan, 
which formed the basis for funding new activities and any significant 
developments of existing services. However, overall decision making at the 
highest level seemed constrained by 'political' factors and ‘product 
championing’. Thus an interviewee described the priority setting process in 
the previous financial year as follows. 
 
“…We got together in the early autumn to say mental health, heart disease, 
strokes are the priority areas. So at that time, I thought the intention was that 
was our priority setting and we would ask for bids in those areas. Then we 
met again in December time …Those bids that were supported in that 
meeting got put on the draft…We met again in March…the financial situation 
had changed. The purpose of the meeting was to chuck things out rather than 
to decide which one to keep in…If there was not a person there who was 
strongly supporting a particular project it got chucked out.” 
 
In Authority B formal processes seemed less well developed and the influence 
of a relatively small group with long standing professional expertise appeared 
greater. Their predominant role was said to arise from their previous 
experience, although it seems likely that their senior positions in the 
organisation also played a part in this. An interviewee here said, with regard 
to the internal planning processes 
 
“Generally, I am quite disappointed with the overall approach to needs 
assessment.” 
 
Nevertheless, in this authority there were ambitious proposals for a rapid 
move to much more formalised decision-making. These were only aspirations 
at the time of interviewing, however, and perhaps, therefore, some scepticism 
was in order; especially in the light of the results of the literature review. For 
example, the interviews revealed a lack of clarity about how priorities were to 
be determined and value for money identified in the new priority setting 
process. 
 
It should be stressed that none of the above is intended to be unduly critical of 
the Health Authorities concerned. While the processes of resource allocation 
were capable of improvement, what is mainly illustrated is the impracticability 
of applying comprehensively rationalistic approaches in this context. 
 
Questionnaires 
Respondents were asked firstly to explain what they understood by the term 
‘priority-setting’. The single most common answer was “getting the most out of 
scarce resources.” Over 52% of the sample gave that or a similar answer; i.e. 
one containing at least some implication of cost-effectiveness. Conversely 
18% gave answers along lines of meeting needs or determining levels of 
service without specific reference to costs or benefits. Rationing was cited 
explicitly in 8% of the answers. 
 
The next question asked whether there was a formal procedure for priority 
setting in the health authority. Whilst a majority of answers (62%) 
acknowledged that there was such a procedure, a significant minority (38%) 
said there was not. Those respondents who answered yes to that question 
were asked to describe the process of priority setting in their authority. (A 
handful of respondents who had answered no also went on to describe a 
process, presumably one they considered to be informal.) The most common 
response (37%) referred to Health Improvement Programmes (HimPs) and 
related frameworks. (HimPs were plans drawn up by Health Authorities on the 
basis of local needs and provided a framework for the commissioning 
decisions of PCTs in the early stage of New Labour’s reforms.) 
 
The extent to which various methods of priority setting were considered to be 
important in the authority was then addressed. Three methods frequently 
criticised by health economists for neglecting costs and benefits were 
considered to be important or very important by a very high proportion of 
respondents. These were incrementalism (80%), target setting (80%) and 
total needs assessment (77%). In contrast programme budgeting and 
marginal analysis, whilst still scoring quite highly, was regarded as important 
or very important in 45% of the answers. Social audit/rapid appraisal, which 
requires significant involvement by the local community, was regarded as 
important or very important by only a third of the respondents. Curiously, a 
quarter of the sample must have regarded both PBMA and, for example, 
incrementalism as important/very important for setting their priorities. This 
implies a willingness to adopt a very mixed approach to resource allocation. 
 
Predictably, political initiatives and agendas were considered to be important 
or very important by 99% of respondents (71% very important). The opinions 
of GPs (98%), Public Health doctors (97%), clinicians in trusts (90%) and 
Health Authority managers (92%) were also considered very influential. By 
contrast, the views of other health professionals (51%), the public (55%) and 
current patients (33%) were less influential. Power and status seem to be 
significant factors here, thus reinforcing the importance of behavioural aspects 
in decision making referred to earlier. 
 
The lowest ranking was for the opinions of health economists. Whilst a quarter 
of the sample considered these to be important, only 1% thought them to be 
very important. However, this does show some recognition for what is, after 
all, a rather new profession. Moreover, 59% of the sample replied that more 
information concerning cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit would be very 
important and 53% desired more information about equity. Only 16% of 
respondents gave a similar response concerning more information on the 
views of the general public. 
 
These results suggest that there was a concern to incorporate considerations 
of costs and benefits into resource allocation decisions, but it seems clear that 
the approaches adopted were pragmatic and eclectic. Not surprisingly, 
political and professional influences had a marked effect on resource 
allocation; whereas, disappointingly, consultation with the general public was 
regarded as less important. Thus the results reinforced the conclusions drawn 
from the earlier stages of the study. 
 
Recent Developments in Programme Budgeting 
According to Lockett, Raftery and Richards (1995), Programme Budgeting 
first engaged health economists in the early 1990s and has its origins in the 
controversial approach known as Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
Systems (PPBS). As they say, 
 
“The recent enthusiasm for programme budgeting … would be less 
disconcerting if the new–found converts showed any awareness of the history 
of the technique, all the more so given the highly unfavourable judgements 
that have been made about programme budgeting in the 1970s …” 
(Lockett et al, 1995, p.90) 
 
(See Jones and Pedlebury, 2000, for a history of PPBS.) 
It is not surprising that the rapid uptake of interest in this approach was 
associated with the early stages of the internal market, as purchasers sought 
out frameworks for priority setting in order to support their resource allocation 
decisions. Similarly, it is no coincidence that interest in Programme Budgeting 
has revived as the New NHS has come to resemble the internal market more 
and more. (See, for example, Department of Health, 2002; Ruta, Mitton,  
Bate, and Donaldson, 2005; Peacock et al, 2006.)  Indeed, a revived interest 
in ‘rationalistic’ approaches seems characteristic of ‘New Labour’. Thus 
Keenan (2000) argues that Best Value, the performance measurement 
framework introduced into local government in the UK in 2000 (and 
subsequently subsumed into the Comprehensive Performance Assessments 
in 2002) contained significant elements of PPBS and Zero Base Budgeting. 
(See Jones and Pendlebury, 2000, for an account of this technique and its 
history, which somewhat resembles that of PPBS.)  
 
However, the later form of Programme Budgeting does seem to have 
important modifications. As Mitton and Donaldson (2003, p.102) say, “… 
different authors have proposed various formats” for programme budgeting. 
Mooney, Gerard, Donaldson, and Farrar (1992) promoted an earlier 
conception of the process as follows: 
 
1. Define programmes 
2. Establish programme management groups 
3. Define sub-programmes 
4. Focus on the margin 
5. Draw up incremental/decremental wish lists 
6. Cost wish lists 
7. Examine the relative benefits of changes in spending on programmes/ 
sub-programmes 
8. Make resource allocation decisions 
 
It is interesting to compare this with Mitton and Donaldson’s own later and 
much less rigid format based on “five questions pertaining to the use of 
resources” (Mitton and Donaldson, 2003, p.102): 
 
1. What are the total resources available? 
2. How are these resources currently spent? 
3. Where might more resources be allocated and what would be the 
effectiveness of this spending? 
4. Are there areas of care which could be provided with the same 
effectiveness, but at lower cost? 
5. Are there areas of care, which are effective, but should receive less 
resources because spending elsewhere would be more cost-effective? 
 
Mitton and Donaldson (2003) advocate involving both the public and experts 
in decision-making whilst still stressing the need for evidence based decision-
making. In general, the tone of the approach to programme budgeting they 
propose seems more pragmatic and practical than before. There is a welcome 
recognition of the need for PBMA to be adjusted for organisational fit, for 
economic evaluation to be part of a broader priority setting framework and for 
the inclusion of equity as well as efficiency into the criteria for decision-
making. Moreover, it is ultimately the relevant decision-makers who must 
decide whether and which changes in resourcing should take place.  
In addition, an intriguing and most commendable aspect of Mitton and 
Donaldson’s paper is their recognition of the need to draw on organisational 
theory. As they say, 
 
 “Of course, some unresolved issues do remain within the PBMA framework 
and its application…Perhaps the most important point is the need for more 
work in the area of health organization behaviour, whereby experts in that 
field can work collaboratively with health economists…to positively impact 
strategic planning and priority setting activity.”  
(Mitton and Donaldson, 2003, p.103) 
 
Nevertheless, they claim that this approach would still adhere to the key 
economic principles of the margin and of opportunity cost. Strictly speaking, 
however, this would mean identifying the marginal cost and marginal benefit 
of each additional unit of output and assessing the opportunity cost of 
foregoing the benefit of any other possible use of the incremental spending.   
Whilst this is at least conceivable in the traditional ‘widget factory’, it is very 
difficult to see how it could possibly be applied in the complex context of 
health care.  
 
Indeed, what normally happens in the application of programme budgeting is  
that quite large blocks of budget allocation are moved around budget 
headings on the basis of quite imprecise notions of benefit (and even of cost), 
based on expert or informed lay opinion. This seems much closer to Zero 
Base Budgeting than marginal analysis (or, to be more precise, a variant 
known as Priority-Based Budgeting; see Connolly and Ashworth, 1994).  
 
Programme Budgeting and the ‘New NHS’ 
These developments are not only interesting in themselves, but also 
significant because, following the initiation of the national Programme Budget 
Project which began in 2002, the Department of Health is adopting the 
technique for use in the NHS. The project exists to develop information so that 
NHS agencies can carry out programme budgeting which, in this context, is 
defined as  
 
“a retrospective appraisal of resource allocation, broken down into 
meaningful programmes, with a view to tracking future resource allocation in 
those same programmes.”  
(Department of Health, 2007, p.4 – my bolding)  
 
Consequently, financial information concerning all SHA and PCT expenditure 
is to be analysed into programmes of care based on medical condition. 
However, as usual in such exercises, the number of categories represents a 
compromise between the appropriate degree of specificity and a manageable 
range of programme budgeting classifications (Department of Health, 2007). 
The Department of Health acknowledges that the implementation of 
programme budgeting is a process which will require refinement over a long 
period. Thus, for the time being, a category of Other will be maintained for 
activity which cannot be identified with medical condition, preventative action 
or social care. Moreover, some difficulties are expected to persist indefinitely. 
For example, it is accepted that not only is information on diagnosis  for 
community patients not collected routinely at present, but also that the 
approach adopted in different Trusts is unlikely ever to be totally consistent. 
 
The purpose of introducing programme budgeting into the NHS is stated as 
being to obtain comparative information which would assist in the 
identification of where resources are invested currently, the evaluation of the 
efficacy of current patterns of resource allocation, assessments of the most 
effective ways of investing in the future and improved understanding of issues 
concerning equity. 
 
Therefore, the Department says, 
 
“Programme Budgeting is much more than an accountancy tool. The 
information produced through the implementation of Programme Budgeting 
will help inform and improve commissioning decisions.” 
 (Department of Health, 2007, p.6) 
 
However, even allowing for it being a technical guide, it is striking that the 
manual gives very little guidance as to how this is to be achieved. Thus, 
presumably, health agencies will be free to experiment in ways of using 
programme budgeting to aid management. It is also intriguing that there is 
only one reference to marginal analysis in the document.1 
  
This suggests some pragmatism in application which is to be welcomed, 
although there is the danger that the approach may only be adopted 
ritualistically and merely become an exercise in retrospective book-keeping.  
It will be important, therefore, for research to be carried out which traces the 
ongoing development of programme budgeting in the English health service. 
Whilst the technical aspects of implementation should be investigated, there 
must be a danger of concentrating on the technicalities of information 
systems, costing and financial reporting. So it will be important to also 
examine the social, organisational, cultural and behavioural issues which will 
arise as the technique is put into place.  
 
Conclusions 
The similarity of the current structure of the NHS to the internal market has 
been established and the desirability, therefore, of referring back to earlier 
studies, such as the one on which this paper is based, seems validated. All 
three stages in the study gave general support to the original hypotheses.  
Difficulties with availability and reliability of data, the importance of internal 
'political' pressures and lack of integration within decision-making were found 
in the Health Authorities in the study. This suggests that an unmodified form 
of conventional health economics cannot be applied successfully to either the 
study or the practice of resource allocation in health care. The findings thus 
repeated previous research by indicating the limitations of ‘rationalistic’ 
approaches to decision-making. A modified version of health economics, 
however, could help to 'muddle through' more elegantly.  
 
In so far as these conclusions are likely to be still valid, they suggest 
limitations to the efficacy of market mechanisms in this context and to claims  
that techniques like programme budgeting can be used to determine (as 
opposed to facilitate) the commissioning of services, although more 
contemporary research would be valuable.  
 
Programme budgeting is a particularly significant topic at present because the 
technique is being promoted for adoption in the English NHS. However, there 
are intriguing issues concerning this. One the one hand, the Department of 
Health has high aspirations for the use of the technique, which past 
experience suggests is unlikely to be attained. One the other hand, what the 
Department is currently mandating and supporting might be better described 
as programme costing than budgeting. There may well be a middle way 
between these two positions which will prove viable. At the same time, it 
should be acknowledged that academic accounts of programme budgeting do 
now recognise the need for a more pragmatic version of the technique. This 
should fit better with the organisational and behavioural aspects of resource 
allocation in the complex context of health care and would also support inter-
disciplinary study. 
 
Footnote 
That is apart from the glossary (Department of Health, 2007, p. 54) which 
gives this notably broad brush definition “an appraisal of the added costs and 
added benefits when resources in programmes are increased or deployed in 
new ways.”   
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